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Abstract: 
 
Cybercrime is rising rapidly in India. Developing economies such as India face unique 
cybercrime risks. This paper examines cybercrime and cybersecurity in India. The literature on 
which this paper draws is diverse, encompassing the work of economists, criminologists, 
institutionalists and international relations theorists. We develop a framework that delineates the 
relationships of formal and informal institutions, various causes of prosperity and poverty and 
international relations related aspects with cybercrime and cybersecurity and apply it to analyze 
the cybercrime and cybersecurity situations in India. The findings suggest that developmental, 
institutional and international relations issues are significant to cybercrime and cybersecurity in 
developing countries. 
 
Keywords: cybercrime | cybersecurity | India | white-collar crime 
 
Article: 
 
Introduction 
 
Cybercrimes originating from and affecting India are escalating rapidly. Among the Indian 
organizations, which responded to KPMG’s [1] Cybercrime survey report 2014, 89 % considered 
cybercrime as a “major threat” (p, 3). According to the Norton Cybercrime Report 2011, 30 
million Indians had become cybercrime victims, which cost the Indian economy $7.6 billion a 
year. Another estimate suggested that 42 million Indians were victimized online in 2011 [2]. 
India has also been a target of high profile international cyberattacks. For instance, while the 
Stuxnet virus was programmed to damage Iran’s centrifuges at Natanz nuclear site, it also 
infected computers in India [3]. 
 
India also generates significant amount of cybercrimes that affect Internet users worldwide. For 
instance, India was the top origin country for spam in 2011 and 2012 [4, 5]. Likewise, a phishing 
survey released by the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) in April 2012 found that India 
had the highest phishing TLDs by domain score (calculated as phish per 10,000 domains) in the 
second half (H2) of 2011 [6]. India is also among the top click fraud originating countries 
outside North America [7]. Finally, according to the U.S.-based Internet Crime Control Centre, 
India ranked fifth in the number of complaints received by the agency [8]. 
 
Since the degree of digitization of economic activities is tightly linked to the probability of 
experiencing cyberattacks [9], India’s massive digitization efforts deserve mention. Among the 
most ambitious is the Unique Identification Authority of India (UIDAI) project. The new 
government of India (GoI) led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) has indicated that it would 
provide a strong support for the UIDAI project, which would require residents to have biometric 
IDs in order to collect government benefits. The project has set a target of 1 billion enrolments 
by 2015 [10]. The biometric ID assigns a person a 12-digit number, which is called the Aadhaar 
number. It requires the collection of 10 fingerprints, iris scans and other information such as the 
name, date of birth and address and will be hosted in the eGovernance cloud platform. 
 
As a consequence of the above mentioned observations, there is an increasing cybersecurity 
concern among organizations, individuals and government agencies. Due to the country’s lack of 
indigenous technology and patents related to cybersecurity, the GoI has announced that it would 
provide financial incentives to Indian firms to acquire foreign firms with high-end cybersecurity 
technology [11]. The Ministry of External Affairs would explore possible targets worldwide 
through Indian embassies and missions. The fact that Indian government agencies have been 
under cyber-attacks, suspected from foreign governments, has provided a major motivation for 
such an approach. An Indian company which owns the technology gained through the 
acquisitions is required to give the government agencies an access to the IPR. 
 
A number of issues motivate this paper. First, criminologists have emphasized the need to 
understand the causes and motivations of frauds against consumers against the backdrop of rapid 
growth in such frauds and other types of crimes transcending international boundaries [12, 13, 
14, 15]. Prior researchers have also suggested that an understanding of the structure of 
opportunity associated with white-collar crimes would help take countermeasures to prevent 
such crimes [16]. This argument is equally valid for cybercrimes. 
 
Second, it is estimated that only about 10 % of cybercrimes are reported,1 in India; and of those 
reported about 2 % are actually registered. The conviction rate was estimated at as low as 2 % 
[19]. As of August 2009, only four people in the country were convicted for cybercrimes [20]. 
Until 2010, there was not a single cybercrime related conviction in Bengaluru, the biggest 
offshoring hub. The total number of convicted cases by 2010 was estimated at less than 10 [21]. 
Past studies have suggested three explanations that may account for the low rates of prosecutions 
and convictions and differential treatment of white-collar offenders: organizational advantage 
argument, alternative sanctions argument and system capacity argument [22, 23, 24, 25]. This 
article attempts to examine these explanations and associated mechanisms in more detail in the 
context of cybercrime by drawing upon institutional theory and international relations 
(IR)/international political economy (IPE) perspectives. 
 
Third, previous research has indicated that cybercrime and cybersecurity in developing 
economies have unique structural characteristics [26, 27]. Yet the literature does not discuss how 
key economic and social characteristics of developing countries such as low levels of human 
development and education and weak democratic institutions [28] are connected to cybercrime 
and cybersecurity. A related point is that while the roles of dual economy have been examined in 
the context of the growth of the informal sector [29], it is not clear how dualism would affect the 
key ingredients of cybercrimes. 
 
Fourth, prior research has provided some evidence regarding the roles of public-private 
partnership (PPP) in fighting cybercrime and enhancing national cybersecurity (e.g., [26, 30]). In 
a study of the PPP in the fight against terrorism, Bures [31], however, reported that private 
businesses’ roles were not appreciated and many private sector representatives considered the 
public-private partnerships more like” public-private dictatorships”. More conclusive evidence is 
clearly needed to assess the contexts, mechanisms and processes associated with the 
effectiveness of public-private partnership. 
 
Finally, policy makers need to re-examine various local and international tools and procedures to 
combat crimes with cross-border dimension. In this regard, while some attention has been paid to 
corruption and economic crime [32], relatively little systematic attention has been paid to 
international cybercrimes. 
 
In an attempt to fill the above research gaps, the article draws together a wide variety of research 
from a number of fields such as criminology, international political economy (IPE), international 
relations (IR), institutional theory and developmental economics to examine cybercrime and 
cybersecurity in India. We first discuss relevant theories and concepts in order to develop a 
framework to cybercrime and cybersecurity in developing economies. Next, we apply the 
framework in the contexts of cybercrime and cybersecurity in India. Then, we provide discussion 
and implications of our study. The final section provides concluding comments. 
 
Relevant theories and concepts 
 
Institutional and economic factors 
 
In order to provide insights into the low rates of prosecution and conviction for cyber-offenders 
in India, it is necessary to look at formal and informal institutions. Past researchers have 
recognized that economic activities and actors are embedded in formal and informal institutions 
[33, 34]. A related point is that the nature of activities of cybercriminals fits squarely with what 
Baumol [35] calls destructive entrepreneurship. Baumol hypothesized that the distribution of 
productive, unproductive, and destructive entrepreneurs is a function of the payoffs offered to 
these activities by the society’s rules of the game. These rules are referred as institutions [36]. 
 
Economic and social characteristics of a developing economy 
 
Some of the key economic and social characteristics of a developing country include a dual 
economy, low levels of income and education, which lead to low levels of human development; 
high unemployment rates, high degrees of income inequality, and weak democratic institutions 
[28, 37]. We would argue that these characteristics are tightly connected to cybercrime and 
cybersecurity. 
 
For instance, low levels of income and education lead to relative laggardness in developing 
world-based businesses’ and consumers’ adoption of new technologies. Many Internet users in 
the developing world are inexperienced and not technically savvy as a high proportion of them 
got their computers and connected to the Internet not long ago. A majority of them also lack 
English language skills. This later point is crucial due to the fact that most of the information, 
instructions, and other contents for security products are available in English language only. 
Many Internet users in economies in the developing world are unable to use IT security products 
developed in English language [26, 27]. 
 
In its basic form, a dual economy is characterized as one that has a relatively developed urban 
industrialized sector and a rural sector [37]. The dual nature of the economy also means that in 
addition to variation between sectors of the economy, developing economies are characterized by 
an uneven development within a given sector [38]. Cybercrimes targeting developing economies 
tend to be concentrated in well-developed industry sectors such as businesses in the online 
gaming industry in China, banking and financial sectors in Brazil and the offshoring sector in 
India [26, 27]. 
 
Causes of prosperity and poverty 
 
Based on a review of the literature, Acemoglu [39] and Acemoglu et al. [40] have identified 
fundamental and proximate causes of prosperity and poverty. These are presented in Table 1 and 
the last column shows how some of them are linked to cybercrime and cybersecurity in India. 
 
Table 1 
Causes of prosperity and poverty and their relations to cybersecurity orientation 
 Explanation Relevance to 
cybersecurity in 
developing economies 
Example from India 
Fundamental causes of prosperity and poverty 
Political and 
economic 
institutions 
• Institutions such as 
corruption, lack of 
accountability and weak 
law enforcement create 
bottlenecks for 
development [41] 
• National governments 
poorly equipped to deal 
with crimes. 
• Many governments lack 
technological 
sophistication and are 
poorly equipped to fight 
the non-state criminal 
actors. 
• Congestion in law 
enforcement systems: 
severe lack of law 
enforcement manpower 
reported in Delhi, Mumbai 
and other cities. 
• Lack of criminal 
database 
Culture or 
informal 
institutions 
• Sets of beliefs 
generated by some 
cultures may have anti-
developmental 
consequences [42]. 
• Cybercrime are 
associated with a lower 
degree of stigmatization 
than in industrialized 
countries 
• Lack of guilt, remorse 
and an ethical sense 
among cybercriminals 
• Call center employees 
consider it “undignified” 
to undergo security checks 
• password sharing is 
common: cases of crimes 
associated with such 
practice 
Proximate causes of prosperity and poverty 
Human 
capital 
• Most developing 
economies fail to invest 
enough in education and 
skills. 
• Lack of cybersecurity 
related manpower 
• Lack of cybersecurity 
orientation of Internet 
users 
• Significantly less 
number of cyber 
specialists than the 
demand 
• Sense of over-reliance 
on basic security solution 
such as antivirus 
Technology • Developing economies 
tend to have low 
investment in R & D and 
low rate of adoption of 
technology 
• They also have a 
tendency to use low-cost 
technologies 
• Low rate of adoption of 
cybersecurity-related 
technology 
• Underdeveloped 
cybersecurity industry 
• Low-cost technologies 
are more prone to cyber-
threats 
• Lack of indigenous 
technology and patents 
related to cybersecurity 
• A higher proportion of 
computers using crime 
prone technologies such 
as IE6 
• Researchers in R&D per 
million people lower than 
in other BRIC economies 
 
Institutions, culture and geography are arguably fundamental causes of prosperity [39, 40]. 
Economically successful societies are characterized by good economic and political institutions 
[43]. Likewise, culture is related to different sets of beliefs regarding how people behave, which 
has strong implications for development [42]. Institutional theorists consider culture as an 
informal institution [36]. Since geography has a limited role in cybersecurity, we focus on the 
roles of formal and informal institutions. 
 
First, we illustrate a direct connection between institutions and cybercrime/cybersecurity. As to 
many developing economies’ capability to build cybersecurity-related institutions, while the 
states “hold some trump cards” “at the most basic level”, for instance, with their power to define 
the activities that are illicit ([44], p. 409), many governments lack technological sophistication 
and are poorly equipped to fight the non-state criminal actors. Regarding the informal 
institutions, while most traditional illicit activities are viewed as deviant and carry a social 
stigma [44], this is not necessarily the case for cybercrime-related activities. For instance, many 
criminal hackers based in the developing world see their cybercrime activities victimizing 
developed world-based consumers and businesses as morally acceptable [45]. 
 
Among the proximate causes are physical capital differences, technology differences, human 
capital differences and functioning of markets [39]. In this paper, we focus on technology 
differences and human capital differences. 
 
Institutional bottlenecks in developing economies 
 
Building on the work of Roland [46], de Laiglesia [41] classifies institutions according to the rate 
of change: “Slow-moving” institutions include legal infrastructure, culture and social norms, 
while laws, rules and regulations, contract enforcement, political process and governance are 
examples of “fast moving” institutions. Some elements of fast-moving institutions such as 
corruption, lack of accountability and weak law enforcement may create bottlenecks for 
development. 
 
The impacts of slow-moving and fast moving institutions on cybersecurity can be better 
explained with the concept of institutional bottlenecks. In a framework proposed by de Laiglesia 
[41] for an analysis of institutional bottlenecks in developing economies, technology-related 
issues and factors are present at three levels: technological progress and dissemination 
(institutional outcomes), technology opportunity set (interaction and decision area), technology 
use, adoption and development (intermediate outcomes) ([41], p. 14). In this section, we analyze 
these elements from the perspective of cybersecurity. 
 
One way to understand the low level of technological progress is the lack of absorptive capacity, 
which means that many developing economies lack capabilities to assimilate technologies and 
associated organizational practices [47, 48]. This is mainly due to their institutional and social 
arrangements [49]. In expanding their attack sources such as botnets, hackers tend to focus on 
economies with less developed IT infrastructures [50]. In this regard, as to the technological 
progress and dissemination, most developing countries are characterized by poor performance in 
cybersecurity infrastructures. They often lack domestic anti-virus companies. Businesses and 
consumers in some developing countries also prefer to buy domestically manufactured software. 
 
Developing economies also tend to use low cost and insecure technologies. While some argue 
that networks in developing have built-in security mechanisms as they have “wired security into 
their IT network infrastructure” compared to the Western approach of “bolting it on afterward to 
legacy systems” ([51], para. 11), contrary observations have been reported. 
 
Some developing country-based manufacturers also reportedly use cybercrime-prone products in 
order to reduce the cost of PCs and other devices. The documents of a cyber-fraud lawsuit filed 
by Microsoft against a Chinese-owned domain provide a glimpse into this phenomenon. 
Microsoft’s digital crimes unit investigating counterfeit software and malware in China had 
bought 20 new computers from Chinese retailers. The unit found counterfeit versions of 
Windows installed on all the machines and malware pre-installed on four of them [52]. It was 
reported that when a brand new and direct from the factory condition laptops bought in Shenzhen 
was booted up for the first time, the Nitol virus was hidden in the laptop’s hard drive. The virus 
started searching for another computer on the Internet. The laptop was made by a Guangzhou, 
China-based computer manufacturer, Hedy [52]. 
 
Differential treatment to white-collar offenders 
 
Based upon the related literature of white-collar offenders [22, 23, 24, 25], three explanations 
can be offered regarding the differential treatment of cyber-offenders. According to an 
organizational advantage argument, offenders that are in “organizationally shielded” positions 
receive more lenient treatment. Hagan and Parker’s [22] analysis of securities fraud in Canada 
indicated that employers were less likely to be prosecuted under criminal statutes than were 
offenders in lower-class positions. The authors concluded that organizational structure of 
corporations embedded class advantage in such a way that employers were often shielded from 
prosecution. 
 
According to an alternative sanctions argument, civil sanctions may replace criminal sanctions in 
the response to white-collar crimes. Shapiro’s [24] study of violators of securities law in the U.S. 
indicated a higher tendency to prosecute lower-status offenders than higher-status ones. Her 
analysis, however, indicated that the variation in prosecutions and sanctions across different 
levels of status was due to the availability of alternative sanctions in cases involving higher-
status offenders and was not because of a class bias. 
 
Finally the system capacity argument maintains that the legal response to suspected crime is a 
function of organizational resources and caseload pressures [23]. Resource limitations are of 
particular concern for white-collar crimes due to their complexity, which require substantial 
amounts of investigative and prosecutorial efforts [25]. 
 
It is recognized, however, that the three explanations above provide complementary rather than 
mutually exclusive interpretation regarding the differential treatment of white-collar offenders. 
For instance, prior research indicates that the limited capacity of criminal justice agencies due to 
the complexity and hidden nature of white-collar crime and the system overload caused by such 
crimes reduces state capacity to respond to such crimes [53]. Likewise, due to the difficulty 
involved in obtaining direct evidence against high level criminals that are “organizationally 
shielded”, system capacity limitations may lead to prosecution of lower-level employees, for 
whom it is easier to locate the evidence ([25], p. 53). 
 
International relations (IR)/International political economy (IPE) perspectives 
 
In light of the cross-border nature of most serious cybercrime activities, In order to provide 
further insights into cybercrime and cybersecurity in India, it is also important to understand the 
importance of cyber-security issue from the IR/IPE perspective. A large body of literature 
indicates that with the decline of violent geopolitical conflicts, traditional issues such as nuclear 
war are losing salience and the focus and organizing principle in international relations have 
been on nontraditional security issues [54, 55, 56]. Cyber-threat is increasingly recognized as a 
legitimate security issue because cyber-attacks present threats to national security for the simple 
fact that most of the critical infrastructures are connected to the Internet [57, 58]. This issue is 
also tightly linked to economic security of countries. 
 
The state’s regulatory/participatory roles and public-private partnership 
 
An analysis of the regulatory and participatory roles of the state would provide a helpful 
perspective in identifying the potential roles of the public and the private sector in strengthening 
data privacy and security protections (Table 2). By regulatory state, we mean a set of factors that 
influence the enforcement of contracts, sound political institutions and the rule of law, corruption 
of public officials, bureaucratic quality, a strong and effective court system and citizens’ 
willingness to accept the established institutions [60, 61]. There are a number of barriers and 
challenges in India to perform the functions of the regulatory state. The states have faced budget 
problems and have failed to comply with federal directives to hire more judges and upgrade legal 
infrastructures and court facilities [62]. 
 
Table 2 
 Direct effects Effects associated with indirect 
causal chains and externality 
Maintaining 
established orders 
• Enforcing industry codes 
related to cybersecurity 
• The requirement of external 
audit of cybersecurity practices 
• Providing law enforcement 
agencies with cybersecurity-
related expertise 
Facilitating 
institutional 
changes 
• Developing new industry codes 
and norms related to 
cybersecurity to account for 
shifts in technology, market and 
other external factors. 
• Mimetic effects associated with 
high performing members 
• Help develop national 
cybersecurity regulative 
framework 
Adapted from Kshetri & Dholakia [59] 
 
The participatory state captures the extent to which policies and institutions represent the wishes 
of the members of society [61]. In such a state, businesses may participate in the national policy 
making arena through “dialogue, litigation, and mimesis” ([63], p. 502). Prior research indicates 
that business groups can work closely with state agencies to protect their independence and 
autonomy [64]. 
 
Applying the framework in the Indian context 
 
Political and economic institutions 
 
Various sources of institutional bottlenecks noted above [41, 46] are a major concern in India, 
and are even greater and more evident in cybercrime and cybersecurity. For one thing, the gap 
between the law in the book and the law in the action has been substantial. India has clearly 
experienced rapid growth in cybercrime and congestion in cybercrime related law enforcement 
systems. For instance, consider India’s only Cyber Appellate Tribunal (CAT), which started 
functioning since 2006 [65]. It was reported in June 2014 that the tribunal had not adjudicated a 
single case during the previous 3 years due to the non-availability of the chairperson and judicial 
members [66]. 
 
To take another example, in 2004, of the 4,400 police officers in India’s Mumbai city, only five 
worked in the cybercrime division [67]. As of 2011, the Delhi police cybercrime cell had only 
two inspectors [68]. In 2012, the Delhi High Court criticized the lack of functionality of the 
Delhi Police website, which according to the court was “completely useless … obsolete and does 
not serve any purpose” ([69], p. A1). 
 
The observations in the prior literature regarding the complexities of white-collar crimes, 
difficulty involved in obtaining direct evidence against criminals involved and the system 
overload caused by such crimes, leading to a limited capacity of criminal justice agencies and the 
state to respond to such crimes [25, 53] have special significance to cybercrimes in India. For 
instance, the Information Technology Act 2000 (Amended in 2008) did not cover issues such as 
data protection and privacy, which hindered the development of call-center and BPO industries. 
A survey reported that while most BPOs in Gurgaon had been cybercrime victims, about 70 % of 
the respondents did not report to the police [70]. Most organizations expressed concerns about 
competence, professionalism and integrity of the police in handling cybercrimes. About 50 % of 
the respondents not reporting thought that the cases are not dealt with professionally and 30 % 
noted that they had no faith in the police [70]. 
 
India’s social scientists have speculated and law enforcement officers have admitted that the 
actual numbers of crimes in the country are significantly greater than what are reported in the 
official crime statistics by National Crime Records Bureau and other agencies [12]. To put things 
in context, according to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) (http://ncrb.gov.in/), in 
2013, the states of Mizoram, Nagaland and Sikkim did not register any cybercrime related cases. 
The reason probably could be attributed to the lack of reporting of cybercrimes in these states 
rather than the non-occurrence of cybercrimes in these states. 
 
One reason behind the low rate of registration of cybercrime cases concerns the barriers, hurdles 
and hassles that confront the victims. In some cases the police show unwillingness to take the 
extra works needed for the investigations [21]. There are reports that the police allegedly were 
unsupportive to victims, who wanted to file a cybercrime case. Cybercrime victims have also 
complained that the police follow a long and inefficient process to build a case [68]. 
 
A related point is that a major factor behind the low conviction rate concerns the technological 
illiteracy and low level of cybercrime awareness in the law-enforcement community. For 
instance, it was reported that when a police officer was asked to seize the hacker’s computer in 
an investigation, he brought the hacker’s monitor. In another case, the police seized the CD-
ROM drive from a hacker’s computer instead of the hard disk [20]. 
 
In one way, there is the development of a vicious circle: a) law enforcement agencies’ 
unwillingness to put efforts for investigating cybercrimes and their technological illiteracy 
indicate that they lack the skills, orientation and capability to address cybercrime related 
offenses; b) the survey conducted among Gurgaon-based BPOs indicates that there are low 
cybercrime reporting rates because of the victims’ lack of confidence in law enforcement 
agencies: and c) cybercriminals may become more confident, resourceful and powerful because 
their offenses are not reported. 
 
A final point that must be considered concerns the international political economy of 
immigration. Whereas immigration policies in most industrialized economies provide a legal tool 
to restrict entry and settlement, such policies are weak in India, which partly explains the 
Nigerian cyber-fraudsters’ presence in India. For a Nigerian cybercriminal, for instance, fewer 
efforts are required in establishing a predatory group in India compared to that more advanced 
economies such the U.S. 
 
Over the past few years, the popular press in India has routinely published story about Nigerian 
cybercriminals’ engagement in cybercrimes, principally based on social engineering techniques. 
Indians are reported to be victims of various versions of “Nigerian 419” frauds, which account 
for a significant proportion of cyber-frauds in the country. Below we discuss some representative 
examples among the numerous ones reported in the media. In 2012, Indian Police arrested six 
Nigerians for allegedly defrauding hundreds of Indians. They seized 14 laptops, seven memory 
sticks, 23 mobile phones, fake documents and cash [4]. A Defense Research & Development 
Organization (DRDO) scientist reportedly paid Rs. 5.5 million (about US$110,000) to a Nigerian 
scammer [71]. In another case, in 2009, two Nigerians were arrested in Kolkata, who duped a 
housewife paying Rs. 122,000 (US$2,400) for a lottery scam [72]. The police suspected that they 
were members of a cybercrime ring, ran a fake lottery scam and made more than Rs. 10 million 
(US$200,000) in 3 months before their arrests. 
 
It is important to understand the modus operandi used by the Nigerian cybercrime rings. A 
Nigerian national involved in fake job racket, which allegedly victimized at least 40 people, had 
recruited several women in his gang as money mules. Note that money mules in cybercrimes are 
often duped and recruited on-line to transfer stolen money illegally. The mules falsely think that 
they are employed in a legitimate business. The victims were asked to deposit Rs. 6,000–60,000 
(US$ 110–1,100) as travel and related expenses for interviews. The women’s bank accounts 
were used to receive the crime proceeds and their ATM cards were used to withdraw cash. The 
victims were promised that the money would be refunded after the interview [73]. In light of 
prior findings, which indicate a high degree of vulnerability of Indian women in the cyberspace 
[74], this is yet another mode of victimization of women. 
 
Recent regulatory developments 
 
In an attempt to address some of the above issues, India is seeking to improve cybersecurity 
performance through regulatory developments and institutional reforms. As a response to 
domestic and international pressures to enhance cybersecurity measures, in July 2013, the GoI 
released National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) 2013, which set forth 14 objectives that 
included enhancing the protection of critical infrastructure, and developing 500,000 skilled 
cybersecurity professionals by 2018 [75]. The development of PPP efforts towards enhancing the 
cybersecurity landscape is a also key component of the NCSP. The GoI has made efforts to 
create a favorable climate for a higher participatory involvement in cybersecurity. For instance, a 
Joint Working Group (JWG) on cybersecurity was established with representatives from 
government agencies and the private sector, which was mandated to come up with 
recommendations for consideration by the GoI on PPP in capacity building and policy making. 
The JWG released its report “Engagement with Private Sector on Cyber Security” in October 
2012. As a further sign for an improving climate for participatory involvement of the private 
sector, in October 2012, India’s National Security Advisor announced a plan to establish a 
permanent working group on cybersecurity with representatives from the government and the 
private sector. The working group would implement the country’s cyber-defense framework. The 
NSA advisor noted that this would mark the first time that the GoI allowed the participation of 
the private sector in national security matters [30]. 
 
Among other positive changes in the Indian cybersecurity landscape, in July 2014, the IT 
minister informed the lower house, Lok Sabha that all central and state/Union Territory 
government agencies had been asked to conduct security auditing of their IT infrastructures, 
websites and applications. State governments were also asked to build adequate technical 
capacity including infrastructure, cyber police stations and sufficient manpower [76]. Likewise, 
in 2011, the central bank, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) introduced a set of recommendations, 
which include the formation of separate information security groups within banks and 
maintenance of adequate cybersecurity resources based on their size and scope of operation. 
 
Culture or informal institutions 
 
The Asians often emphasize on social harmony and human relationships whereas the 
Westerners’ place relatively higher emphasis on efficiency and control of time [77]. This aspect 
of the Asian culture has a clear cybersecurity implication. For instance, call center employees in 
India consider it “undignified” to undergo security checks [78]. A related point is that due to the 
social circumstances, password sharing is more common in India than in the West. There have 
been reported cases of crimes associated with this practice. In 2010, an employee of the Indian 
IT company, Wipro used his colleague’s password to steal about US$4 million from the 
company’s bank account [79]. 
 
The lack of previously developed mechanisms and established codes, policies, and procedures 
and non-existence of identifiable victims in many cases [80] are likely to lead to much less in 
cybercrimes guilt compared to conventional crimes. These conditions are more likely to be 
prevalent in the developing world, where cybercrimes is more likely to be justifiable. An official 
of India’s Cyber Crime Investigation Cell (CCIC) noted that many young people in the country 
have committed cybercrimes for fun “without actually realising the gravity of their actions” 
([81], para 11). 
 
A related point is that in many cases, people engaged in cyber-offenses are not aware of the 
potential damage that their activities can cause to others. For instance, studies found that click 
fraud is pervasive in India but most people involved in such frauds click on ads just to make 
money and may not know that some businesses are victimized by their activities. 
 
Human capital and technology 
 
Studies and reports issued over the past few years have pointed out that a severe shortage of 
qualified cybersecurity professionals currently exists in India. One estimate suggested that India 
needs 250,000 cyber specialists to deal with cybercrime [82]. According to the market research 
firm, International Data Corporation (IDC), only 22,000 security professionals were available in 
India in 2012 whereas the country needed 188,000 [83]. 
 
There is also a severe lack of cybersecurity orientation among consumers, businesses and policy 
makers. According to a Norton survey, 60 % of Indian Internet users believed that a basic 
security solution such as antivirus would be sufficient for cybersecurity [84]. Cybersecurity 
orientation has also been low among high-level politicians. In 2012, three Indian lawmakers 
resigned after they were filmed allegedly watching pornography on a cell-phone during debate at 
a state assembly in Bangalore [85]. 
 
According to the World Bank, India had 100 researchers in R&D per million people in 2000 (the 
numbers for other BRIC economies were: Brazil: 424, China: 548 and Russia: 3,451) [86]. 
Looking at more recent data, according to a report presented by the then Science and Technology 
Minister Kapil Sibal to the Rajya Sabha, the upper House of the Indian Parliament, India had 156 
researchers in R&D per million people in 2008. As a point of comparison, according to the 
World Bank, the corresponding numbers for other so called BRIC economies for 2008 were: 
Brazil: 696, China: 1,199 and Russia: 3,152. Sibal suggested that universities in India were 
characterized by inferior R&D quality and capabilities [87]. A related point is that much of the 
R&D in India is geared toward smaller projects that complement other innovation centers in 
Silicon Valley and elsewhere [88]. 
 
India’s status as a low human development country also means that most cybercrimes associated 
with the Indian offshoring industry are related to inside abuse rather than high-tech crimes 
requiring super-hacker skills. Here, for illustration, we offer some representative examples. In 
2005, workers at Pune, India, subsidiary of Mphasis, a provider of outsourcing services, 
transferred about US$500,000 from four Citibank customers’ accounts to their personal 
accounts. This was among the first major BPO scams in India [89]. In another case, the British 
Tabloid, Sun, reported that an employee of the Gurgaon-based BPO firm Infinity E-Search sold 
confidential information of 1,000 bank accounts for US$5.50 each to its reporter working as an 
undercover [58]. In still another case, in 2006, two employees of Mumbai-based BPO, Intelenet 
Global allegedly manipulated credit records of 400 U.S. customers [89]. In a more recent case 
reported in March 2012, two ‘consultants’, who claimed to be workers in Indian offshoring firms 
met undercover reporters of The Sunday Times. They came with a laptop full of data and 
bragged that they had 45 different sets of personal information on about 500,000 U.K. 
consumers. The information included credit card holders’ names, addresses, phone numbers, 
start and expiry dates and security verification codes. Data for sale also included information 
about mortgages, loans, insurance, phone contracts and Television subscriptions [90]. In another 
interesting example, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) sued the California-based 
American Credit Crunchers in 2012, According to the FTC, a company based in India associated 
with American Credit Crunchers made threatening calls to U.S. consumers with histories of 
applying for payday loans, which are short term, high interest loans that are typically applied 
online. Agents in India with massive amount of personal data allegedly called potential victims 
and threatened the victims if they did not pay the fictitious loans of up to US$2,000. U.S. 
consumers had lost over US$ 5 million to the scam by 2012, which had been in operation since 
2010 [89]. 
 
India’s low R&D profile has an important implication for cybersecurity. Due to poor R&D and 
innovation performance, some liken economic activities in the Indian IT and offshoring industry 
to a “hollow ring”. An Economist article notes: “India makes drugs, but copies almost all of the 
compounds; it writes software, but rarely owns the result. … [it has] flourished, but mostly on 
the back of other countries’ technology” ([91], para 1). Regarding the location of R&D activities 
in Russia, Moscow-based Kaspersky Lab’s CEO and Chairman Eugene Kaspersky noted: 
“[Engineers in] China or India …are good if you just want something programmed, but if it’s 
about research, then it has to be Russia” [92]. 
 
Notably absent from India are complex and sophisticated malware and spyware. Note that the 
creation of sophisticated malware is a R&D intensive task. One explanation of the lack of 
sophisticated malware originated from India could be the country’s low R&D profile. To further 
understand the absence of major malware originated from India, it is also worth noting that 
unlike some developing countries, India lacks major anti-virus companies. For instance, in 2010, 
Moscow-based Kaspersky Lab was the world’s fourth biggest IT security company. Some other 
former second world economies also have top IT security companies such as Czech Republic’s 
AVG Technologies, Romania’s BitDefender, and Slovak Republic’s ESET [93]. Likewise, the 
Belarusian firm VirusBlokAda was the first company to identify the Stuxnet code in June 2010 
[94]. This issue is important as malware firms and anti-virus companies tap into the same skill 
base. 
 
India’s cyber-victimization can also be partly attributed to the country’s crime-prone 
technologies. According to Microsoft’s IE6Countdown website, as of January 2012, 6th version 
of IE6 accounted for 6 % of browsers in India [95]. 
 
The dual economy’s implications 
 
As to the dual economy’s implications, India’s well-developed legitimate IT industry is 
associated with a low cybercrime rates, especially involving sophisticated and complex malware. 
Nandkumar Saravade, ex-director of cybersecurity for the National Association of Software and 
Services Companies (NASSCOM) noted: “.. .. any person in India with marketable computer 
skills has a few job offers in hand” ([96], para 9). 
 
The duality of the Indian economy also means that there is a high degree of intersectoral 
differences in cybercrime target attractiveness. More specifically, as indicated by some of the 
most high-profile and widely publicized cybercrimes, the Indian offshoring industry has become 
a lucrative target for data thieves. Data frauds have been reported in call centers in major cities 
such as Pune, Hyderabad, Bangalore, and Gurgaon. A survey indicated that most BPOs in 
Gurgaon had been cybercrime victims [70]. In first- and second-tier cities, data brokers 
reportedly obtain data from offshoring companies’ employees and sell to cybercriminals [20]. 
 
A further implication of the duality is that some illegal and extra-legal global enterprises have 
opened call centers in India. In the early 2008, a criminal group involved in botnet attacks set up 
offices in India to process applications that cannot be completed automatically [97]. Information 
technology (IT) workers in India offered help to facilitate signing up of free e-mail accounts. 
Likewise, the Ukrainian scareware producer, Innovative Marketing Ukraine had established call 
centers in India [98]. 
 
These realities of the cyberspace have put tremendous pressures on Indian companies in the 
offshoring sector to strengthen cybersecurity. In an attempt to address their clients’ 
cybersecurity-related fear, Indian outsourcing firms have taken strict measures. They have 
established biometric authentication controls for workers and banned cell phones, pens, paper, 
and Internet access [99]. Computer terminals lack hard drives, e-mail, CD-ROM drives, or other 
ways to store, copy, or forward data [100]. Indian outsourcing firms also extensively monitor and 
analyze employee logs [99]. 
 
The roles of industry bodies and trade associations 
 
An extensive literature is devoted to explore firms’ participation in cooperative ventures and 
alliances such as trade associations [101]. Some researchers argue that network-based 
organizations such as trade and professional associations represent an alternative to the coercive 
state [102, 103]. Note that one of the roles of trade and professional associations is to monitor 
their members’ compliance with normative and coercive expectations [104]. In this way, they 
can play an important role in defining key issues within an industry or a business sector and 
facilitating the diffusion of the concepts and practices associated with those issues [105]. 
 
When the state’s regulatory roles are weak, trade associations and industry bodies may fill the 
regulatory vacuum. Previous research has suggested that interfirm linkages such as trade 
associations in emerging economies can play an important role in establishing moral legitimacy 
of the industry in Western economies [106]. To put things in context, developed world-based 
offshoring clients may rely more on trade associations such as the NASSCOM than on the weak, 
ineffective state. 
 
Trade associations such as the NASSCOM influence industry behaviors in a number of ways. 
First, these associations’ norms and codes can influence firms to behave in a certain way by 
penalizing noncompliance with various mechanisms [36]. Second, prior research indicates that 
such associations can work closely with state agencies to protect their self-regulating 
independence and autonomy [64]. Just as important is the fact that in some situations, the state 
finds it beneficial to collaborate with them to rationalize an arena of activity [107]. Professional 
and trade associations thus play an important role in strengthening the regulative institutions by 
providing the state with their expertise in developing new regulatory framework and 
strengthening the enforcement mechanisms [59]. 
 
Influencing and monitoring industry behaviors 
 
In light of the state’s inability to enforce regulations due to various bottlenecks [41, 46], the 
NASSCOM monitors member companies to ensure they adhere to the standards. For instance, 
the NASSCOM requires its members self-police and provide additional layers of security. Non-
compliant companies would lose memberships [108]. The Data Security Council of India (DSCI) 
is a self-regulatory member organization set up by the NASSCOM to create trustworthiness of 
Indian companies as global outsourcing service providers. Companies that fail to secure can be 
fined up to US$1 million [19]. 
 
Trade associations such as the NASSCOM influence industry behaviors directly as well as 
through indirect causal chains (Table 2). Indirect effects related to externalities also arise via 
mimetic isomorphism, which entails mimicking behaviors of other actors that are perceived to be 
exemplar and have a higher degree of effectiveness [109, 110]. Most obviously exemplar firms 
serve as models for smaller firms to imitate. In such a case, knowledge flow takes place by 
externalities [111, 112, 113]. It is important to emphasize that while mimetic isomorphism may 
take place in the absence of an association, the association is likely to accelerate the process by 
stimulating interaction among member companies. 
 
A trade association’s enforcement strategy becomes efficient and powerful if a large number of 
firms in the industry join the association [102]. NASSCOM members and professionals have 
supported the DSCI enthusiastically. As of August 2014, the DSCI had about 700 organizations 
as Corporate Members, and more than 1350 security and privacy professionals and practitioners 
as its Chapter Members [30]. 
 
The NASSCOM’s measures have paid off brilliantly. Commenting on data security measures in 
the Indian offshoring sector, a report of the UK’s Banking Code Standards Board (BCSB) noted: 
“Customer data is subject to the same level of security as in the UK. High risk and more complex 
processes are subject to higher levels of scrutiny than similar activities onshore” ([114], para. 
12). Citing the findings of the BCSB and Forrester Research, the NASSCOM’s then president, 
Karnik, asserted that security standards in Indian call centers were among the best in the world 
and there were more security breaches in the U.K. and the U.S. in 2005 than in India (AFX 
[115]). 
 
Contribution to the formulation of cybersecurity-related legislation and policy framework 
 
The NASSCOM partnered with the Ministry of Information Technology to draft data protection 
and data privacy laws to respond to privacy concerns of offshore clients [116]. A main goal was 
to bring Indian data protection laws to the same level as the European and the U.S. standards. In 
2011, the DSCI announced a plan to set up a cloud security advisory group that would develop a 
policy framework. The group would also advise the GoI on security and privacy issues in a cloud 
environment [117]. 
 
Many of the NASSCOM’s responses are the results of a hollow state and the thin institutions that 
hamper legislative and law enforcement efforts. For instance, India lacks standard identifiers like 
the U.S. Social security number making it difficult to check potential employees’ backgrounds. It 
was reported that a thorough background check cost up to $1,000 per employee to [118]. In 
response to the lack of such databases, in 2005, NASSCOM announced a plan to launch a pilot 
employee-screening program called “Fortress India”, which would allow employers to screen out 
potential workers who have criminal records. Subsequently it was developed into the National 
Skill Registry (NSR), which allows employers to perform background checks on existing or 
prospective employees. It is a voluntary registry for call center employees (Table 2). 
 
Facilitating the enforcement of legislation 
 
Various ongoing efforts and activities initiated by the NASSCOM and the DSCI in facilitating 
the enforcement of cybersecurity regulations in the country deserve mention. They prepared a 
detailed project report to set up cybercrime police stations and Cyber Labs across the country. 
NASSCOM helped police departments of Mumbai and Thane in establishing cybercrime units 
and in training officers [119]. In 2005, NASSCOM announced a training initiative for Pune’s 
cybercrime unit [120]. A cybercrime unit established in Bangalore in 2007 has resources to train 
more than 1,000 police officers and other law-enforcement personnel annually [121]. As of April 
2014, there were eight Cyber Labs in various Indian cities, which provided training to over 
28,000 police officers [122]. 
 
The NASSCOM and the DSCI also meet with bar councils in different cities to educate legal 
communities. In addition, NASSCOM offered to work with authorities in the U.K. and India to 
investigate cases involving identity theft [123]. This issue is especially important because 
identity theft-related crimes are rapidly growing worldwide [124]. 
 
The West’s response to India’s weak cybersecurity performance 
 
The observations regarding the decreasing salience and level of nontraditional security issues and 
the evolution of cyber-threat as a more legitimate security issue [54, 55, 56, 57, 58] are 
consistent with the emergence of IR issues involving India. India’s weak cybersecurity 
infrastructures and capabilities have been a matter of concern to Western countries. India 
undoubtedly occupies an important geopolitical position, which has made it an attractive target 
for high profile politically motivated cyberattacks. At the same time, such a position would 
qualify for a strategic partnership with major global players. Cybersecurity experts, for instance, 
have preached that in order to win the competition with China, the U.S. government needs to 
work with like-minded countries such as India to define international norms about cyberspace 
[125]. There have already been some progresses on this front. In July 2011, the U.S. and India 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to promote cybersecurity related cooperation 
and exchange information [126]. In April 2012, bilateral talks were held between India and the 
U.S. While the talks also included a number of other issues, the main emphasis was on India’s 
cybersecurity capacity. As India has emerged as a major offshoring destination for back offices 
as well as other high value business functions, cybersecurity orientation of Indian businesses has 
been an issue of pressing concern to U.S. businesses. The U.S. officials involved in the talks 
were especially interested in India’s capability to detect and investigate cybercrime. India has 
also signed MoU on cyber security cooperation with Japan and South Korea [127]. 
 
Discussion and implications 
 
The escalation of cybercrime activities originated in and affecting India can be attributed to 
formal and informal institutions that are conducive to such activities as well as poor 
cybersecurity orientation of consumers, businesses and government agencies. India’s approach to 
cybersecurity and capabilities are economic developmental as well as international relations 
issues facing the country. 
 
As to the escalation of cybercrime activities originated in India, cybercriminals consider Indian 
computers as low hanging fruit due to weak cybersecurity. The weak cybersecurity condition can 
be attributed to the low level of human development [28, 37], unaffordability of and inability to 
use IT security products [26, 27], resource limitations to respond to cybercrimes due to their 
complexity [25] and resulting institutional bottlenecks noted above [41, 46]. Indian computer 
networks have provided the means to commit cybercrime acts for foreign criminals. A case in 
point is the European hacker nicknamed Poxxie, who broke into the computer network of a U.S. 
company in 2011 and sold the credit card information to underworld buyers. Poxxie’s site was 
run from an Indian server CVV2s.in [128]. 
 
Second, industrialized economies clearly perform better in terms of the economic and 
institutional conditions discussed above and thus provide unfavorable environment for 
cybercriminal. An upshot is that developing economies such as India become top cybercrime 
hotspots as cybercriminals are forced out of industrialized economies with strong controls, 
regulations and cybersecurity measures. For instance, security specialists believe that the arrests 
of several spambot operators in the U.S. forced others to operate from India and other developing 
countries [129]. Note that the U.S., which was No. 1 spam generator for many years, was not on 
the top 10 spam-sending countries list in 2011. 
 
Third, a low level of income as discussed earlier is a key characteristic of a developing economy 
[28, 37]. India’s low wages have been an attractive factor for performing some cybercrime 
activities from the country. One example concerns generating clicks on ads, and collecting 
commission from pay-per-click (PPC) programs. In this regard, most search terms cost just US$ 
0.10–0.15 per click. Let’s assume that it takes 8 s for an individual to click on an ad and view a 
page and the advertiser has to pay US$ 0.10 to a PPC provider for the click. At this rate, the 
clicker’s activities generate US$ 45 per hour. Even if we assume that PPC providers and other 
intermediaries involved in click fraud activities take 90 % of this amount, the clicker can still 
make US$ 4.50 per hour. This amount is much higher than many people make in developing 
countries. Declining connectivity and computer costs have made this a reality. 
 
To better illustrate how weak formal and informal institutions have facilitated cybercrimes, 
consider click fraud activities. There were reports that housewives, college graduates, and 
working professionals in India make US$ 100–200 per month by clicking on Internet ads [130]. 
It was reported that fraudsters openly advertised in national newspapers in India looking for 
people, who would use home computers to click on Internet ads [131]. Many click fraudsters 
engage in such activities just to make money and they do not know that their actions would be 
victimizing businesses. 
 
Uneven and unequal development associated with the duality of the Indian economy [28, 37] has 
translated into differential risks as well as differential cybersecurity performance and capability. 
This can be illustrated best by comparing India’s outsourcing sector with other economic sectors. 
The outsourcing sector has become the target of many high-profile cybercrime incidents. 
Consequently the industry was forced to take measures to strengthen the cybersecurity 
orientation. 
 
The PPP constitutes an important force that has substantially contributed to strengthening 
cybersecurity in India. Contrary to the findings reported by Bures [31], the outcome of the 
NASSCOM-government partnership in India has been a fruitful one, which is based on mutual 
understanding and trust. As to the NASSCOM‘s measures to enhance cybersecurity, it is worth 
noting that the Indian economy is less centralized with more room for associations to flourish 
and to have a strong voice [132]. A strong mutual interdependence between the state and the 
private economic actors, particularly organized business groups, has developed very quickly 
after the economic liberalization of the 1990s. 
 
It is also interesting to contrast and compare this situation with China, where non-government 
entities, special interest groups and the civil society are organized loosely. There is little room 
for these groups to influence national policymaking. Some nascent special-interest groups such 
as environmental and animal-rights organizations and sports clubs have placed new demands on 
the state and created competition for resources, attention, status and legitimacy. While such 
groups provide tremendous societal benefits, their potential for mobilizing people on a regional 
or even nationwide scale has increased the government’s nervousness. Although China’s 
industrial leaders and state science and technology officials have repeatedly appealed to the 
government to take measures necessary to increase the participation of the trade, industry and 
professional associations, unsurprisingly, the regime has responded with reluctance and 
resistance to accept an increased role of the independent civil society. 
 
Regarding the low cybercrime reporting rates, it is worth noting that reporting rates are also low 
for some forms of conventional crimes. Chockalingam’s [12] findings indicated that many 
crimes occurring in India are not reported, the police recorded version of facts about crimes may 
provide only a limited perspective on the realities of victimization and police figures “are only 
the tip of the iceberg”. In order to provide further insights and a deeper understanding of this 
issue, it is important to consider primary and secondary victimization. Note that primary 
victimization occurs when a person becomes a victim of the crime itself. Some mechanisms 
involved in primary victimization include physical/psychological suffering or financial losses. 
Secondary victimization, on the other hand, takes place due to the actions of the victim’s social 
environment. Key mechanisms involved in secondary victimization include stigmatization, social 
isolation, or intrusive and humiliating questioning [133]. Secondary victimization also occurs 
due to journalists’ faulty and insensitive practices in gathering or reporting news or inappropriate 
actions of the criminal justice system [133]. As noted earlier, law enforcement agencies’ 
unsupportive attitudes and unwillingness to help victims have contributed to a low reporting rate 
of cybercrime cases [68]. 
 
Prior researchers have noted that despite the existence of laws against cyber-harassment in India, 
the criminal justice system in the country has failed to perform its roles. Worse still, cybercrime 
victims may face further victimization [134]. For instance, in some cases of online victimization 
(e.g., bullying, stalking, defamation), as a response to the offender’s actions, the victims 
themselves are likely to engage in activities that can be considered to be a crime. In such cases, 
police, lawyers and the courts may blame the victim of an online assault [135]. 
 
The issue of stigmatization deserves further elaboration and discussion. Wiesenfeld et al. [136] 
argue that arbiters’ “constituent-minded sensemaking” influences stigmatization process. They 
have identified three categories of “arbiters”— social, legal, and economic [136]. Social arbiters 
include members of the press, governance watchdog groups, academics, and activists. Tandon 
[133] reported that Indian media have a tendency to invade the privacy of victims, offenders and 
celebrities. In this regard, some criminal activities are more likely to be of interest to the media 
than others. These may include crimes involving children, sexual offenses [133] and new 
criminal activities such as cybercrimes [7]. Concerns related to secondary victimization by the 
media are likely to result in low reporting rates. For instance, a study of four South Indian cities 
indicated that only 4 % of the victims of sexual offences had reported the crimes to the police 
[12]. 
 
Chockalingam [12] also found that, in cases involving consumer frauds and corruptions the 
reporting rate was less than 1 %. In such cases, consumers and citizens often fear that they would 
be penalized in future dealings with law enforcement agencies, government agencies and 
commercial organizations if they report such crimes [12]. In this example, law enforcement 
agencies, government agencies can be considered to be legal arbiters, who enforce rules and 
regulations. Commercial organizations on the other hand can be viewed as economic arbiters, 
who make decisions about engaging in economic exchange with individuals [136]. 
 
As noted earlier, among cybercrimes that are reported, prosecution rates are low. A main reason 
why cyber-offenders are often not criminally prosecuted may not be not because alternative 
sanctions are applied as predicted by the alternative sanctions argument [24], but no sanctions 
may be actually imposed. This is similar to what prior research has noted in the context of the 
economies in the Former Soviet Union and Central and Eastern Europe (FSU&CEE) [58]. On 
the other hand, while most international cybercriminals were found to “jurisdictionally shield” 
themselves in some FSU&CEE economies due to their low degree of cooperation and integration 
with the West, this is not the case for India-based cyber-offenders. As noted by prior white-collar 
crime researchers [25], resource limitations are of particular concern for addressing cybercrime 
issues in India due to their complexity, which require substantial amounts of investigative and 
prosecutorial efforts. The findings of prior research on cybercrime in FSU&CEE economies 
regarding the outdated regulative institutions and unwillingness of law enforcement agencies to 
pursue cyber-fraud cases as the criminals mainly victimize foreigners [58] are less relevant in 
India. 
 
Regarding the regulative institutions, as mentioned earlier, while legal infrastructures are slow-
moving institutions, laws, rules and regulations are considered to be fast moving institutions. 
India has been relatively quick in following the global trend in enacting cybersecurity related 
laws and regulations. For instance, the Information Technology Act was passed in 2000, which 
was amended in 2008 to address a number of issues (e.g., adoption of electronic signatures and a 
more detailed and careful approach to child pornography). For instance, the Information 
Technology Amendment Act of 2008 has made it an offence to facilitate the abuse of children 
online. 
 
Nonetheless, the development of legal infrastructures such as building a well-functioning 
cybersecurity-related court system, employing judges well versed in cybersecurity and 
enforcement mechanisms has been a challenging problem for the GoI. Likewise, a large number 
of IT security auditors are needed to evaluate the adequacy of controls in the management of 
project and business processes and validate whether the controls are effective [137]. An estimate 
suggested that in 2013, India had only 60 auditors [76]. Regarding the requirement of 
government agencies to conduct security auditing of IT infrastructures, websites and 
applications, it is important to note that most Indian government agencies’ websites are hosted 
by the National Informatics Centre (NIC), which was established by the GoI to promote IT 
culture among government organizations. It is argued that NIC-hosted websites are vulnerable to 
cyberattacks due to a shortage of manpower, especially IT security auditors. NIC outsources 
security audit works due to the lack of manpower. The country is also finding it difficult to 
enforce the RBI guidelines due to the lack of IT security auditors to validate banks’ 
cybersecurity practices [138]. 
 
Concluding comments 
 
India has begun developing ambitious digital projects such as the UIDAI. It is pursuing equally 
ambitious plans in the area of the development of cybersecurity professionals. Recent measures 
such as the National Cyber Security Policy (NCSP) can help put the Indian cybersecurity 
landscape on the path toward a brighter future. For instance, the lack of human resources is a key 
problem facing the GoI. If India is successful to accomplish even a part of the goal of developing 
500,000 skilled cybersecurity professionals by 2018, it would be a considerable achievement. 
 
While factors such as corruption, lack of accountability and weak law enforcement have created 
bottlenecks for development in India, such bottlenecks seem to have more negative effects on 
cybersecurity. In addition, cybercrime activities in India are also associated with a lower degree 
of stigmatization than in the West. Due to these factors, India’s overall cybersecurity orientation 
is weak. Cybersecurity currently is also relatively a low priority for the GoI due to tremendous 
resource pressure to address problems related to poverty and underdevelopment. Overcoming 
these policy and institutional bottlenecks that constrain the country’s ability to fight cybercrimes 
is central to improving the cybersecurity profile. This is important because this problem is 
increasingly recognized in broader economic sectors and thus no more limited to the offshoring 
industry. 
 
The unique features of the Indian dual economy are connected in many ways with cybercrime 
and cybersecurity. In part, relatively lower rate of cybercrimes in India compared to that in some 
former Soviet economies may be due to the development of the legitimate IT industry. A related 
point is that India’s low R&D profile is associated with the lack of the origin of sophisticated 
malware products. 
 
It is reasonable to expect that cybersecurity awareness levels of consumers, businesses and 
policy makers will improve in the future. While culture is considered to be a slow-moving 
institution, even some aspects of culture that are linked to cybersecurity (e.g., a high propensity 
to share password) is likely to change over time. In order to further strengthen Internet users’ 
cybersecurity orientation, contents related to cybersecurity need to be appropriately integrated in 
the high school and university curricula. 
 
Major roles have been played by trade associations such as the NASSCOM to strengthen India’s 
cybersecurity landscape. Such roles are especially valuable in the context of the state’s weak 
regulatory roles in India. However, compliance is voluntary. Moreover, best practice security 
standards, procedures, guidelines developed by the NASSCOM have relatively little influence in 
strengthening cybersecurity outside the offshoring industry. While the DSCI’s codes of behavior 
are irrelevant outside the offshoring sector, training and education to law enforcement personnel 
are one of the key mechanisms to strengthen the national cybersecurity profile. In this regard, 
one reason behind the extremely low conviction rate could be that the training programs 
provided by the DSCI often are insufficient to develop measurable competence in cybercrime 
investigation among law enforcement officers. A majority of the initiatives are special lectures or 
programs that do not last longer than 3–5 days. More comprehensive training programs will 
allow them to master the cybercrime investigation techniques, and feel confident about their 
ability to deal with cybercrimes. While most of the current programs mainly focus on police 
officers, the DSCI and the GoI need to place more emphasis on educating prosecutors, judges 
and lawyers using practical and layman’s language. 
 
Footnotes 
1. It is important to recognize that, as is the case of any underground economy [17], estimating 
the size of a country’s cybercrime industry and its ingredients such as reporting rate is a 
challenging task. Cybercrime-related studies and surveys are replete with methodological 
shortcomings, conceptual confusions, logical challenges and statistical problems [18]. 
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